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Alexander Bickel famously observed that the Supreme Court was
"the least dangerous branch" because it is, in theory, the least political
institution.' Its job was simply to settle disputes over the meaning of
statutes and to decide constitutional questions, but only when absolutely
necessary.2 Setting the policy of the land just was not its domain. That
was for the political branches.3
This is good theory, but it hardly reflects reality in practice. Rather,
the Court has been a political football since John Adams' midnight
appointments in 1801.4 Part of this, of course, is because of the
inescapable fact that virtually any choice between statutory or
constitutional interpretations has policy implications. The Bill of Rights
may be a beautiful, moving, and majestic document, but it is also
relatively vague and reveals very little about what it means. While some
cases may just be a matter of calling "balls and strikes,"5 people care
* James Lewis Parks Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I would like
to thank the participants at the symposium for their comments on the initial presentation of this
material and my research assistant, Kevin Stockmann, for his excellent research assistance. Any
errors or omissions are my own.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 1, 29-33 (1962). Bickel's ideas have roots in the Federalist Papers. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure .. . [because it has] neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment .... ).
2. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 33, 235.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
4. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (Robert C. Clark
et al. eds., 14th ed. 2001).
5. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary: S. Hearing 109-158, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States),
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about the ones that have greater implications. There simply are not right
answers about many constitutional or statutory questions, such as those
involving affirmative action, abortion, and the death penalty to name just
a few hot button issues. In these situations, the ideology of the decision
maker matters.
By my estimate, the current ideological battle over the Court began
in the late 1950s with the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education outlawing racial segregation in public schools. 6  Though
unanimous, it was a very controversial decision at the time and spawned
a decade of spirited critique by conservative scholars and politicians.
Inspired by Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, Richard M. Nixon ran for
president in 1968 against the Supreme Court on the promise that he
would appoint conservative judges who would end the activism. And
the battle was on, reaching its boiling point with the nomination of then-
Federal Circuit Judge Robert Bork9 and continuing to a lesser degree
with most subsequent high court nominations. In the course of this
ongoing debate, conservative jurisprudence has come to be equated with
"judicial restraint," 0 while a liberal judicial philosophy has come to be
associated with "judicial activism."" Both of these terms are in
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh l09-158/browse.html.
6. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place.").
7. See David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of
Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1089-99 (2004) (discussing the political turmoil surrounding court-
ordered school desegregation).
8. William G. Ross, The Role ofJudicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 391, 435-36 (2002); see also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 94-97 (2004) (explaining how
Goldwater's failed campaign strategy for a more conservative Court laid the groundwork for other
conservatives to stop the Court from taking an activist stance).
9. See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS ET AL., THECAPITOL.NET, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS:
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, PROPER SCOPE OF QUESTIONING OF
NOMINEES, SENATE CONSIDERATION, CLOTURE, AND THE USE OF THE FILIBUSTER 40 n.160 (2010);
Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin', 105 MICH. L. REV. 13151 1316 (2007) (book review).
10. Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 191, 216-17 (2012) ("[The court critics'] stated goal is for judges to exercise 'judicial
restraint,' as exemplified ... by the decisions of Supreme Court conservatives .... .").
11. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139, 1139-40 (2002) ("[T]he current debate raises the question whether an 'activist' court can truly
be 'conservative' at all."). This may be changing in the conservative Court has also been accused of
activism in high profile cases. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that
government may not limit independent expenditures by corporations); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (holding that a lack of uniform standards for counting votes in recounts violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and halting the recount of Florida ballots in the 2000 presidential election).
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reference to the cardinal sin of imposing personal preferences or values
into judicial decision-making.
Now, all of this lofty discussion may seem far removed from a short,
nuts-and-bolts statute like the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). But I
would submit not so, for there is hardly an area on the Court's docket in
which the Court can be alleged to have been more activist than in its
arbitration jurisprudence under the FAA. Indeed, the Court's work in
this area has arguably been the Taj Mahal of judicial activism, as the
Court has taken a simple statute authorizing federal judicial enforcement
of agreements between businesses to arbitrate their disputes and has used
it to create its own version of civil justice reform-a junior varsity
system of private adjudication whose outcomes will be enforced by the
courts, just like their varsity counterparts in the federal and state trial
courts. 2 Ironically, virtually all of this work occurred as the Court made
its historic shift over the last fifty years from Warren Court liberalism to
today's allegedly staunch conservatism.
Much has been written about the errors of the Court's ways on
arbitration, and there is no need to traverse that ground yet again.
Rather, my task in this Article is to look at several of what I term the
Court's bellwether FAA cases through the lens of a conservative judicial
philosophy, asking in particular whether they would have come out the
same if they had been decided by the truly conservative Court promised
by generations of Republican presidents and presidential hopefuls.13 As
we will see, the answer is a resounding no.
In Part II, I provide a common footing by briefly describing the
structure and purpose of the FAA, as well as five bellwether cases
decided under the Act. FAA mavens of course can disagree as to
whether these are the most important of the Court's long line of FAA
case law-such is the stuff of good classroom and cocktail party
discussion. But I think most would agree they are certainly very
important and often provide the core in arbitration practice guides and
casebooks.14 In Part III, I turn my focus to identifying the contours of a
12. For an argument that the Court's jurisprudence actually expanded the public system of
justice rather than creating a private system of alternative justice, see Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice,
47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1104 (2000). The junior varsity analogy is drawn from Justice Antonin
Scalia's brilliant dissent in Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (comparing the Federal Sentencing Commission to a "junior varsity" legislature).
13. See generally Ross, supra note 8 (discussing the role judicial appointments have played in
elections since 1860).
14. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 563-608 (4th
2012]1 885
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truly conservative jurisprudence, which I identify as restraint, fidelity to
text, and an abiding respect for states' rights. I join these discussions in
Part IV by assessing the five bellwether cases identified in Part II
according to these principles of conservative jurisprudence. As I will
demonstrate, all five fail to meet the conservative standard. Finally, I
conclude by musing about what arbitration would be like today if the
cases had gone the other way and had been decided by a truly
conservative Court.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
A. The Statute
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 primarily to legislatively reverse
the historic "ouster doctrine," a centuries-old common law doctrine
under which courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate.s It is
remarkably simple on its face. After a short list of definitions in section
1,16 section 2, the heart of the Act, provides that written arbitration
agreements will be enforced just like any other agreement, as long as the
agreement is enforceable as a matter of contract law.17 Section 4 permits
a court to compel an unwilling party into arbitration if it is satisfied that
there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 8 Section 3 permits a court
to stay related legal proceedings pending arbitration. 9 Section 5 permits
a court to select an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree upon one,20 and
Section 7 permits an arbitrator to summon and hear witnesses during the
arbitration.2' Sections 9 and 13 permit the arbitrator to issue an award
that may be entered as a court judgment.22 After an arbitration, section
10 allows a court to vacate an award where there was corruption,
ed. 2009) (discussing four of the five cases mentioned in Part II).
15. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 102-21 (1992) (discussing the legislative history and
purposes for the FAA); see also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 577, 599-601 (1997) (discussing the history of
the ouster doctrine).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
17. Id § 2.
18. Id. § 4.
19. Id § 3.
20. Id § 5.
21. Id § 7.
22. Id. §§ 9, 13.
886 [Vol. 60
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 886 2011-2012
FAA LAW, WITHOUT THE ACTIVISM
partiality, or other misconduct by the arbitrator, or where the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his or her authority,23 while section 11 authorizes a
court to modify or correct an award.24
B. The Bellwether Cases
Few will question that the Supreme Court has transformed this
relatively narrow, innocuous statute into a powerful engine of civil
justice reform, although views do vary widely as to the propriety of the
Court's efforts.25 Case by case, the Court has built a junior varsity
adjudicatory system that now hears many statutory and common law
claims that would have been heard by courts of law in years past. This
tribunal has broad power to decide legal and non-legal issueS26 without
substantive review (even for clear errors of law), to determine if
obligations to arbitrate have been triggered,2 8 and even to decide the
validity of its own jurisdiction, all without applying the law unless the
parties so require.29 Parties may jointly agree to go to this junior varsity
tribunal voluntarily, but high-power players can also force others-
consumers, 30  employees,3 1  and franchisees, 3 2  for example-into
23. Id. § 10.
24. Id.§ 11.
25. Compare Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 332-33 (arguing that the Court overstepped its bounds by crafting "new national
arbitration law"), with Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 755-57 (1990) (suggesting the appropriateness of this system because of the
policy favoring arbitration), and Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability Question Itself', 10 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 287, 287-89 (1999) (arguing for separability and its allocation of the gatekeeping role to
the arbitrator).
26. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967) ("[N]o claim
is made that Prima Paint ever intended that 'legal' issues relating to the contract be excluded from
arbitration .... ).
27. See Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588-89 (2008) (stating that
because of the policy favoring arbitration, judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to the
grounds provided in the FAA); Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511
(2001) ("[E]ven 'serious error' on the arbitrator's part does not justify overturning his decision,
where, as here, his is construing a contract and acting within the scope of his authority." (citing
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987))).
28. See John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1964) (permitting
arbitrators to determine whether conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met-
the so-called "procedural arbitrability" doctrine).
29. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court gave
arbitrators the power to make determinations as to their own jurisdiction).
30. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997).
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1991).
32. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
8872012]
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arbitration, unless the low-power player wants to bring a class action.3 3
By statute, the triggering mechanism for entry into the Court's junior
varsity tribunal is merely any written agreement to arbitrate any issue
that falls within the furthest reaches of the Commerce Clause,34 and this
agreement will preempt any state law that interferes with its goals or
objectives.3 ' Finally, unlike any other areas of federal law, this junior
varsity tribunal has its own body of substantive law that applies in both
federal and state courts.36 By virtually any measure, this is quite a body
of work, and it likely will only continue to grow if the Court continues to
hear on average an arbitration case or two every Term.
It obviously took many cases to build this edifice. But five cases can
be seen as especially important building blocks in this process. I call
these "the bellwether cases" and describe them further below in order of
decision.
1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. and
Separability
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the
Court dealt with a specific but important question-whether an arbitrator
can decide the validity of the very agreement that gives rise to his
jurisdiction in the first place. 7 The typical situation in which this would
arise is a contract for a sale or service that included an arbitration
provision. For example, in Prima Paint, the paint manufacturer hired
Flood & Conklin, a consulting firm, to assist on certain issues. The
relationship was rocky from the start, and Prima Paint filed suit in federal
district court, seeking to rescind the consulting contract on formation
grounds, arguing that Flood & Conklin had fraudulently induced it to
enter the contract by portraying itself as solvent.39 The question for the
33. Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010) (refusing to
construe silence as permitting class actions to proceed in arbitration).
34. Allied-Bruce Terminix, Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
35. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
36. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
37. 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967).
38. Id. at 397. The precise nature of the consulting agreement is unclear, but according to
Prima Paint's president, Flood & Conklin was to "consult, advise, assist and help [Prima Paint] so as
to insure a smooth transition of manufacturing operations to Maryland from New Jersey, together
with the sales and servicing of customer accounts and the retention of the said customers." Id. at 401
n.6.
39. Id at 398.
[Vol. 60888
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Court, then, was whether the arbitrator or the courts had the power to
decide the fraud claim if the very consulting agreement giving rise to the
arbitrator's jurisdiction was itself legally invalid because it was
fraudulently induced.
The circuits had split on the question,4 0 and the Supreme Court, in a
6-3 vote, upheld what has come to be known as the principle of
separability under the FAA.41
Under § 4 . . . the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to
proceed once it is satisfied that "the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply (with the arbitration agreement) is
not in issue." Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes to "the making" of the
agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.
But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally. 42
The separability doctrine was a significant expansion of the
arbitrator's powers under the FAA on the policy question of who should
decide the validity of so-called "container" contracts. Under the
doctrine, it is arbitrators, not courts, who decide the validity of the
primary contract.4 3 Courts only decide the validity of an arbitration
clause in a container contract if the claim of fraud, mistake, or other
contract defect is directed exclusively at the arbitration provision itself."
2. Southland Corp. v. Keating and Preemption
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that the FAA applies in state courts as well as federal courts, and
that it preempts contrary state law.4 5  In Southland, several 7-Eleven
franchisees sued the franchisor in state court, alleging fraud, breach of
40. Compare Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 1966)
(granting broad authority to the arbitrator to decide this issue), with Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 923-24 (1st Cir. 1960) (holding that this issue was a question for the
court).
41. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04; see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to
Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with
Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REv. 819, 838-40 (2003) (discussing generally the doctrine of
separability).
42. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)).
43. See Reuben, supra note 41, at 838-40.
44. Id
45. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
2012] 889
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contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and-critically for the purposes of this
Article-failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of the
California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL).46 The CFIL required
judicial consideration of any claim brought under state law, 47 but the
franchise agreements all contained arbitration clauses requiring the
arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement."4 8 Southland, the franchisor, moved to compel arbitration.4 9
The trial court granted Southland's motion for all claims other than the
CFIL claim, but the California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
CFIL claim was arbitrable as well.50 The California Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court, finding that the CFIL claim could not be
compelled into arbitration.s' That decision, however, was reversed by
the U.S. Supreme Court:
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration
provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part
of a written maritime contract or a contact "evidencing a transaction
involving commerce" and such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see
nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability
is subject to any additional limitations under State law.52
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, also responded to two
points that Justice O'Connor made in her dissent. First, Justice
O'Connor had argued that the FAA was a procedural statute solely for
use in federal court, but Chief Justice Burger insisted that the use of the
term "involving commerce" in section 2 established the Act's preemptive
effect.5 4
We would expect that if Congress, in enacting the Arbitration Act, was
creating what it thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in
federal courts, it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving
commerce. On the other hand, Congress would need to call on the
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id at 10 (discussing the California Supreme Court's interpretation of Cal. Corp. Code
§ 31512 (West 1977)).
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 10-11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
53. Id. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 14 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 60890
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Commerce Clause if it intended the Act to apply in state courts. Yet at
the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions involving
interstate commerce. We therefore view the "involving commerce"
requirement in § 2, not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the
federal courts, but as a necessar qualification on a statute intended to
apply in state and federal courts.
Second, Justice O'Connor argued that state law claims could not be
arbitrated when raised in state court,56 but again Chief Justice Burger
dismissed the argument as permitting a result that would encourage
forum-shopping.57 The Chief Justice continued:
We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to
enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its
enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. And since
the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in
the state courts, we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the
Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction.
3. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. and the Mandatory
Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. may be the most significant
case of the modem arbitration era because it approved the use of so-
called mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer, employment, and
other standard form contracts, even when statutory rights are at stake. 59
In Gilmer, Interstate/Johnson Lane hired Robert Gilmer as a Manager of
Financial Services.60 As part of the hiring process, Gilmer was required
to sign a registration application with the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in which he agreed "to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or
55. Id. at 14-15.
56. Id. at 31-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
57. Id. at 15 (majority opinion).
58. Id.
59. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991). Even the term "mandatory arbitration" is controversial. See
Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury-
Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003) ("I ask Professor Sternlight (and others) to stop calling
contractual arbitration-mandatory arbitration."). But see Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of
Mandatory Binding Arbitration (if Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 82 n.l (2007)
(disagreeing with Professor Ware's semantic argument, stating that "this phrase perfectly describes
companies' practice of requiring their consumers and employees to submit future and yet unknown
disputes to binding arbitration, rather than to litigation").
60. 500 U.S. at 23.
2012] 891
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controversy" arising between him and the company.6 1 Interstate/Johnson
Lane fired Gilmer six years later, when he was 62, and hired a 28-year-
old with less experience to replace him.62 Gilmer sued the company in
federal district court alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).63 The company moved to compel arbitration
under the FAA, but the trial court denied the motion." The Fourth
Circuit reversed, and Gilmer appealed the case to the Supreme Court. 5
The questions before the Supreme Court were whether Gilmer's ADEA
claims were arbitrable, and if so, whether the compulsion into arbitration
by virtue of a pre-dispute arbitration clause constituted an invalid
prospective waiver of Gilmer's legal rights.66
The Court used the case to send a very clear message to the lower
courts that the ouster doctrine was dead. Citing three opinions that the
Court had decided within the previous six years, Justice White disposed
of the ADEA arbitrability issue summarily:
It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.... In these
cases we recognized that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum."67
Justice White also rejected a variety of generalized challenges to the
NYSE process, all of which "'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with our
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of
resolving disputes."',6 8 Put another way, to the extent that one might
have concerns about arbitrator bias, disparities in bargaining power, and
the fairness of procedures-such as discovery limitations, the convention
61. Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting language from the agreement).
62. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(No. 98-18), 1990 WL 10022915 at *4.
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
64. Id at 24.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23, 26-27.
67. Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614).
68. Id. at 30 (alteration in original).
892 [Vol. 60
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 892 2011-2012
FAA LAW, WITHOUT THE ACTIVISM
against written opinions, and the unavailability of review-they must be
claimed and proved with particularity because arbitration as a process
has the benefit of the doubt.6 9
4. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams and the Employee Exemption
The FAA has a broad sweep with few statutory exceptions. One of
those exceptions is found in section 1, which concludes by stating that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 7 0  The meaning of "seamen" and
"railroad employees" probably seemed clear to the FAA's drafters, and
their exclusion from the FAA seemed necessary. These workers were
generally subject to collective bargaining agreements that included their
own arbitration systems,71 so there was no need for the FAA's anti-ouster
provisions to reach them. The language "workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" was less clear, and as the holy war over mandatory
arbitration continued to wage in the 1990s, plaintiffs' employment
lawyers seized on this language to argue that employment cases were
intended to be excluded from the FAA entirely.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court rejected this
claim by a 5-4 vote and, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, held
that the exemption only applied to workers in the transportation
industry.73 Such an interpretation was necessary, according to Justice
Kennedy, because of the doctrine of ejusdem generis-a longstanding
maxim of statutory interpretation essentially requiring the similar
interpretation of words listed together in a statute.74 Thus, Justice
Kennedy found, the "any other workers" clause is a residual clause that
"should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad
69. See id. at 30-33 (dismissing the plaintiffs challenges to the potential for bias, the adequacy
of arbitration procedures, and the inequality of bargaining power as generalized and contrary to the
Court's endorsement of arbitration as a favored means of dispute resolution).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
71. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450,
452 (1953) (stating that seamen and railroad employees were classes of workers as to whom special
arbitration legislation had already been provided at the time of the drafting of the FAA).
72. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States
Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996)
(analyzing the historical context of the exception to the FAA to conclude that the Act exempts all
employment over which Congress has constitutional authority).
73. 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
74. Id. at 114-15.
8932012]
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employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to
the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it,"
specifically transportation workers. 5 Justice Kennedy added that the
Court would have reached the same result even if the "any workers"
clause stood alone instead of being in concert with other words because
of the Court's broad policy favoring arbitration.76
5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Class Arbitration
In recent years, the battle over arbitration has shifted somewhat from
attacks on the mandatory arbitration systems upheld in Gilmer to
questions of whether claims can be aggregated in arbitration as class
actions and, more pointedly, whether the drafters of arbitration clauses
can include so-called "class action waivers" that preclude class actions in
arbitration. The Supreme Court weighed in on class action waivers in its
watershed ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that
state laws disallowing class action waivers in arbitration are preempted
by the FAA.77
Class actions have been controversial as a means of managing minor
claims because of the potential for abuse by plaintiffs' lawyers, who are
able to generate large fees while producing only a small recovery for
individual class members. Concepcion had every appearance of being
such a case, as the claim was brought on behalf of AT&T cell phone plan
customers who were told in published advertisements that their phones
would be free, but who were nonetheless charged sales taxes for the
transactions.78 AT&T's cell phone plan contracts contained an
arbitration provision that included a class action waiver, meaning,
according to AT&T, that anyone who wanted to challenge the sales tax
charge would have to do so individually in arbitration rather than
collectively through a class action.7 9 When AT&T customers filed their
claims as a class action in a California federal district court, AT&T
moved to compel arbitration,80 and the fight was on.
While Concepcion sounded in class action, and in some respects was
all about class action, the key doctrinal issue for purposes of the FAA
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id.atll5-16.
77. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
78. Id. at 1744.
79. Id. at 1744-45.
80. Id.
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was preemption. Several years earlier, the California Supreme Court had
decided in Discover Bank v. Superior Court to create a rule for the
application of its general unconscionability law to determine whether
class action waivers in the arbitration context were unconscionable.si
Under that rule:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably
involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small
sums of money, then . .. the waiver becomes in practice the exemption
of the party "from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to
the person or property of another." Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be
enforced.82
Because Concepcion was brought in federal court in California on
diversity grounds, the district court applied the Discover Bank rule and
held the class action waiver in the AT&T Mobility agreements
unconscionable, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. Before the Supreme
Court, however, AT&T Mobility argued that the Discover Bank rule was
preempted by the FAA, and the Court agreed. 8 4  "Although § 2's
saving[s] clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses,
nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives," Justice Scalia
wrote for the Court.
California's Discover Bank rule ... interferes with arbitration.
Although the rule does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any
party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post. The rule is limited
to adhesion contracts, but the times in which consumer contracts were
anything other than adhesive are long past. The rule also requires that
damages be predictably small, and that the consumer allege a scheme to
cheat consumers. The former requirement, however, is toothless and
malleable (the Ninth Circuit has held that damages of $4,000 are
sufficiently small), and the latter has no limiting effect, as all that is
required is an allegation. Consumers remain free to bring and resolve
their disputes on a bilateral basis under Discover Bank, and some may
81. 113 P.3d 1100, 1106-10 (Cal. 2005), abrogatedby Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
82. Id. at 1110 (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. CtV. CODE § 1668 (West 1997)).
83. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
84. Id. at 1745, 1753.
85. Id. at 1748.
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well do so; but there is little incentive for lawyers to arbitrate on behalf
of individuals when they may do so for a class and reap far higher fees
in the process. And faced with inevitable class arbitration, companies
would have less incentive to continue resolving potentially duplicative
claims on an individual basis. 86
Scholars and courts are just beginning to assess the impact and
limitations of the Court's still freshly minted opinion. But in spelling out
the potentially significant preemption limits on section 2's savings clause
for the first time, Concepcion will surely stand among the significant
monuments of the Court's arbitration jurisprudence.
III. THE CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
The foregoing cases are five bellwether cases in the Court's FAA
law-a case law that was primarily decided by a Court promised to be
more conservative by Republican presidential candidates and presidents
who had the majority of the appointments during this time period. This
Article now turns its focus to the question of whether these cases were in
fact decided conservatively. This inquiry necessarily begins by
describing what is meant by a conservative judicial philosophy, a task
accomplished through an exploration of the views of three of legal
conservatism's most powerful icons of the last half century-Alexander
Bickel, Antonin Scalia, and William Rehnquist.
A. Alexander Bickel and the Rationale for Restraint
Yale law professor Alexander Bickel is often considered the
grandfather of modern judicial conservatism because of his seminal
writings on conservative constitutional theory. 8 Bickel's story begins
for all practical purposes in 1952, when he clerked for Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter.89 The term was noted for the Court's decision
86. Id. at 1750 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
87. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
88. See Adam 1. White, The Burkean Justice: Samuel Alito's Understanding of Community and
Tradition Distinguishes Him from His Supreme Court Colleagues, WKLY. STANDARD, July 18,
2011, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/burkean-jistice 576470.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2012) (providing a brief biography of Bickel and discussing his influence on others,
especially Justice Alito).
89. See id. It is no small irony that Frank E.A. Sander, who many view as the father of the
modem ADR movement, served as Frankfurter's clerk in the next term. John David Fassett et al.,
Supreme Court Law Clerks' Recollections of Brown v. Board of Education, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
515, 527 (2004).
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to hear re-arguments on a school desegregation case from Kansas, Brown
v. Board of Education-a decision that relied heavily on a memorandum
by Bickel making the case for re-argument.90 In 1956, Bickel joined the
faculty of Yale Law School, where he remained throughout a prolific,
albeit relatively brief, career as a constitutional scholar and occasional
advocate,91 most famously arguing (and winning) the Pentagon Papers
case on behalf of the New York Times.92
Bickel came out of the Legal Process tradition,93 a school that
generally argued that legal policy should be set by neutral legal
principles rather than by political considerations or the personal
preferences of the Justices, and strived to understand and articulate what
those principles should be.94 Bickel's contribution to this literature was
significant and was set out primarily in an important Foreword to the
Harvard Law Review in 1961 entitled The Passive Virtues95 and in a
book released a year later extending that work called The Least
Dangerous Branch.96 The central thesis of his work now borders on
conventional wisdom, a fact that alone attests to its importance.
The starting point is what Bickel called "the counter-majoritarian
difficulty" with judicial review-judicial review is not specifically
provided for in the written Constitution and is therefore in need of strong
justification because its practical effect is to permit the judiciary to
invalidate the work of the political, or majoritarian, branches of our
constitutional democracy. 9 7 Simply raising this issue was a monumental
contribution, as it arguably started the search for a normative theory of
judicial review that continues to this day.
In Bickel's view, the counter-majoritarian difficulty counseled
enormous restraint by the unelected Court.98 He believed that the Court
had what we today might call great institutional capital and that its
90. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE: How QUOTAS
AND PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY 39-40 (1995).
91. See White, supra note 88 (briefly outlining Bickel's career at Yale Law School).
92. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713-14 (1971) (per curiam).
93. The seminal work on legal process is HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958).
94. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 7-9, 15-19 (1959) (discussing the sentiment that political considerations should not shape judicial
policy).
95. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Tenn-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961).
96. BICKEL, supra note 1.
97. Id. at 16-23.
98. Id at 29-33.
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reserves should be drawn upon wisely, only when necessary, and should
not be squandered on issues more prudently left to the elective
branches. 99 The protests that followed the Brown decision may not have
made Earl Warren flinch, but they clearly were instructive to the young
Alexander Bickel.
Bickel articulated this sense of restraint, or prudence, through the
concept of "passive virtues," or the virtues of the Court not deciding
constitutional issues if it does not need to. 00 Bickel also offered a
methodology for implementing this vision, suggesting that the Court
should control its docket by refusing to decide a case in which there is no
consensus as to intensely contested matters.10 Rather, such cases should
be dismissed or decided on procedural grounds of ripeness, mootness,
standing, or political question rather than on the merits.102 To the extent
that the merits need to be reached, they should be decided on narrow
grounds, such as statutory interpretation or a fact-specific constitutional
construction. 0 3
Thus, Bickel laid the intellectual foundation for what came to be the
conservative judicial movement. This occurred in the 1960s, at the
height of the Warren Court's expansion of constitutional rights, and
Bickel's voice was an important scholarly critique of that movement. It
squared well with the lingering frustration over Brown, as well as
conservative apoplexy over the Warren Court's expansion of rights for
criminal defendants, political protesters, welfare recipients, and other
rights proponents.1 04 Such cases made the Warren Court a convenient
target for Richard Nixon to campaign against in his nearly successful
presidential run in 1960, o0 and the appointment of judges who would
take a limited view of the Constitution and of federal judicial power has
been a mantra of Republican presidential candidates ever since. 106 It was
the commitment to this philosophy that led President Reagan to appoint
then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist to replace the retiring Chief
99. Id. at 33.
100. See id at 111-98 (elaborating on the concept of passive virtues).
101. See id at 113-27 (advocating the use of the power to decline to decide cases).
102. Id at 125-26.
103. See id. at 169-83 (advocating deciding cases on narrow grounds).
104. See generally KECK, supra note 8, at 71-93 (discussing the expansion of rights under the
Warren Court).
105. See Ross, supra note 8, at 423-26 (describing the political storm surrounding the Warren
Court and its role in political campaigns).
106. See id at 427-72 (outlining the role of judicial appointments in elections between 1964 and
2000).
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Justice Warren Burger and Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia to fill
Rehnquist's seat on the Supreme Court in 1986,107 President George
H.W. Bush to appoint Clarence Thomas to the Court in 1991,108 and
George W. Bush to appoint former Rehnquist Court clerk John Roberts
and Circuit Judge Samuel Alito to succeed Sandra Day O'Connor in
2005.109 Indeed, it is no surprise that Justice Alito paid homage to Bickel
during his confirmation hearings, to the chagrin of Senate Democrats. 10
This is not to suggest that Bickel's influence was so transcendent as
to affect the broader political and social environment, in which the
country was becoming more conservative. Rather, I suggest that his
influence was more subtle-providing an important part of the
theoretical foundation that could support the larger political
developments that were occurring. While the Warren Court made-and,
remarkably, continues to make-an easy target for politicians to run
against, with Republican presidents and candidates promising to appoint
judges who will apply the law rather than make it, Bickel's prudentialism
helped point the doctrinal path for more conservative judges to follow in
turning the judiciary from left to right. It provided a template into which
the larger set of conservative values could easily settle. These values
came from across the spectrum of conservative interests, including the
promotion of economic"' and property rights, 112 the protection of
traditional moral values"l 3 and original constitutional intent,1 4 the
107. Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
108. Id
109. Id See also Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2004, at 4 ("By promising to appoint strict constructionists, Mr. Bush has embraced the
mantra of every Republican president since Richard Nixon, who first made that promise in his 1968
campaign.").
110. "1 discovered the writings of Alexander Bickel advocating judicial restraint, and it was
largely for this reason that I decided to go to Yale Law School." Ronald B. Standler, History of the
Nomination of Samuel Alito: How and Why He Was Confirmed 52 (Feb. 12, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript) (quoting Samuel B. Alito, Job Application (Nov. 15, 1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at http://www.rbsO.com/alito.pdf.
Ill. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Does What We Know About the Life Cycle of Democracy Fit
Constitutional Law?, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 618-21 (2009) (describing the "connection between
economic justice and political democracy").
112. See Ilya Somin, What IfKelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other Way?, 45 IND. L.
REv. 21, 29 (2011) (noting that Justice Kennedy has provided the crucial fifth vote for several
conservative Supreme Court victories on property rights).
113. See generally Mark R. Thompson, Note, When God Collides with Race and Class:
Working-Class America's Shift to Conservatism, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 243 (2006) (discussing the shift
toward conservatism and the protection of "traditional" moral values in American society).
114. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97
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contraction of the role of the courts in public life, the limitation of civil
and criminal rights,"' the heavier reliance on formalismll 6  and
textualism rather than penumbras and implied rights,"' and the
commitment to constitutional "colorblindness" regardless of its costs." 8
As such, Bickel's work gives rise to the first rule of a conservative
judicial philosophy: the Supreme Court should exercise its judicial
power, especially constitutional power, with great restraint and deference
to the political branches on policy issues.
B. Justice Scalia and Statutory Interpretation
If there were a statutory counterpart to the constitutionalist
Alexander Bickel, a godfather of conservative statutory interpretation, it
would be Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia." 9 Both as a
law professor before joining the bench, and later as a Justice, Scalia has
definitively called for a textual approach to statutory interpretation. 20
Scalia's plea, like Bickel's before him, is one of restraint.' 2 1 Where
Bickel's concern was about unelected judges rather than the legislature
making policy in a democracy, Scalia's is about unelected judges using
various tools of statutory interpretation-intent, purpose, and legislative
history-to impose their own policy preferences into the reading of
statutes.122
VA. L. REv. 1523, 1529-32 (2011) (outlining the "rise and fall of original intent").
115. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 3-5 (1995) (noting "an atmosphere that was unfavorable to the
continued vitality of the Warren Court's mission in criminal cases" and describing some of the
decisions handed down during that era).
116. See Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the
Executive, 91 B.U. L. REv. 273, 291 (2011) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S.
Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008))
("Formalism has been considered a conservative version of the separation of powers . . . .").
117. See Young, supra note 11, at 1210 (noting that "conservatives are generally thought to
oppose the recognition of unenumerated rights").
118. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282-83 (2011) (noting conservative support
for colorblindness at all levels of federal policy).
119. See generally James Edward Wyszynski, Jr., Comment, In Praise ofJudicial Restraint: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 117 (discussing Justice Scalia's
conservatism).
120. Id. at 132.
121. Id. at 141.
122. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 89 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
unelected judges should defer to the will of the people).
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Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation is commonly called
textualism, or sometimes more accurately "new textualism," because it
emphasizes the text of the statute and explicitly eschews any attempt to
ascertain legislative intent or purpose, much less legislative history.123
For Scalia, reflecting perhaps his law and economics background, no
single or controlling legislative intent can exist because 435
representatives, 100 senators, and a president may all have very different
intentions with respect to why they approved a statute, if they approved
at all.124 The idea of legislative purpose is similarly elusive because a
statute may have many different purposes, any one of which (but not
others) could have been compelling to a particular legislator, again
making it impossible to identify a clear statutory purpose. 125 Finally,
legislative history is particularly treacherous for Scalia because there are
so many forms of legislative history-speeches, committee reports, and
testimony, for example-that one can easily manipulate it to mean
whatever one wants. 126
For Scalia, statutory interpretation simply comes down to the words
that are in the statute. Nothing more, and nothing less. Ambiguities of
course will still arise, but they may be resolved in one of two ways. The
first is with the dictionary, preferably one that was in use at the time the
statutory language at issue was drafted.12 7 The second is by reference to
canons or maxims of statutory interpretation-longstanding principles of
judging that have been passed down from generation to generation.12 8
Many of these maxims reflect the kind of restraint in judging that
characterizes the conservative judicial movement. For example, statutes
in derogation of the common law should be interpreted narrowly.129 Or
statutes should be construed narrowly, and their exceptions read
broadly.130 Both of these canons limit the reach of government's power
123. Scalia's particular brand of textualism has been called "new textualism" because traditional
textualism permits some reference to intent and purpose, while Scalia's "new textualism" rejects
even these interpretive techniques. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990) (coining the phrase "new textualism" and discussing Justice Scalia's role in its
development); see also Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
66-67 (2006) (noting that Justice Scalia has emphasized dictionary definitions rather than legislative
intent).
124. Molot, supra note 123, at 27-28 & n. 114.
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 28-29.
127. See id at 66-67 (providing an example of this approach taken by Scalia).
128. Id. at 44-46.
129. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967).
130. See, e.g., In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752, 761 (Mich. 1993) (citing La Court v. Von Platen-
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and, therefore, fit comfortably within a conservative judicial tradition.
The textualist construction of statutes, then, may be identified as a
second principle of the modem conservative jurisprudence.
C. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the Restoration of "Federalism"
The embodiment of judicial conservatism during the period of these
bellwether cases was surely Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, a 1952
clerk for Justice Robert H. Jackson,' who Nixon tapped in 1971 to
replace Justice John Marshall Harlan II as Associate Justice.132
Rehnquist quickly staked out his territory as the Court's most
conservative Justice, and President Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist
Chief Justice, succeeding Warren Burger in 1986.13 Throughout his
tenure on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist's brand of conservatism
reflected the political ideology of the Grand Old Party. He had worked
on the 1964 presidential campaign of Arizona Senator Barry
Goldwater, 3 4 whose anti-government, anti-Washington appeal laid the
ideological foundation for a generation of Republican leaders from
Nixon and Reagan to the Bushes.
On the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist would come to defer to the
government position, but his conservative signature would be his strong
belief in states' rights.13 5 He believed in the Constitution as a document
limiting an already limited government and read the Tenth Amendment
as a broad and active reservation of powers to the states.136 As Chief
Justice, he led a "federalism revolution,"' 37 limiting federal power by
ruling that federal minimum wage laws do not apply to state government
employees, 3 8 ruling that federal laws cannot "commandeer" state
governments to implement their policies,139 and holding for the first time
Fox Co., 220 N.W. 697 (Mich. 1928); People v. Love, 391 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. 1986)).
131. See William Hubbs Rehnquist (1924-2005): Biographical Data, CORNELL LEGAL INFO.
INST., http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.bio.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ PROJECT AT ILIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/william_hrehnquist (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
135. Id.
136. Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address at the Willamette Law Review Symposium (Mar. 11,
2005), in 41 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 827, 834-35 (2005).
137. Id. at 828.
138. Nat'1 League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
139. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
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that the federal commerce power has limits that Congress may not
exceed.14 0 By the time of his death of 2005, Rehnquist's conservative
imprint on the Court was clearly secure, and it may well prove to be his
most enduring legacy.
D. A Conservative Judicial Philosophy
It is of course difficult to fully describe the nuances of a conservative
judicial philosophy in a few short pages. The views of Bickel, Scalia,
and Rehnquist, however, do help identify a few particularly important
principles that will suffice to assess whether the Court's arbitration
jurisprudence during the ascension of its conservatism was consistent
with that conservatism. The first principle, from Bickel, is that of
restraint-courts should rule narrowly and avoid deciding issues of
policy that are properly in the province of the other political branches. 14 1
The second principle, from Justice Scalia, extends the first to the
construction of statutes by urging that the words of the statute themselves
be the primary unit of interpretation without regard to amorphous terms
like "intent," "purpose," and "history" that can be easily manipulated by
preference. 142 Finally, from Chief Justice Rehnquist, we get an
appreciation of the broad sphere of states' rights and the narrow reach of
federal power, as well as a scent of the Republican political agenda.14 3
While not the totality of the conservative judicial philosophy, these
principles are sufficiently important to provide reasonable modes of
analysis of the bellwether cases I have identified.
IV. REVISITING THE BELLWETHER FAA CASES THROUGH A
CONSERVATIVE LENS
Having identified the Court's bellwether FAA cases in Part II and at
the least the basics of a conservative judicial philosophy in Part III, I now
140. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress' power to regulate commerce), superseded by statute, 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (determining that the
Violence Against Women Act exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
141. See supra Part III.A.
142. See supra Part III.B.
143. See supra Part III.C. I do not mean to suggest that the Chief Justice operated with a partisan
bias favoring the Republican Party. Rather, I am simply reiterating the conventional wisdom that
Justices tend to reflect the ideology of their appointing president.
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come to the crux of this Article-applying the conservative criteria to the
cases.
A. Prima Paint and Separability
In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the scope
of arbitral power by allowing arbitrators to decide the validity of the
document giving rise to the arbitrator's jurisdiction if the arbitration
provision was included in a larger contract.'" In the view of the Prima
Paint Court, the arbitration clause was a "separate" contract from the
larger contract, and if the arbitration provision broadly included all
disputes arising under the agreement, then a dispute over the validity of
the larger contract would simply be one such dispute.145 For this reason,
the rule of Prima Paint has come to be known as the "separability"
doctrine.14 6
I have criticized this decision at length elsewhere,14 7 but here I look
at it from the perspective of consistency with conservative judicial
principles and contend that a court applying conservative principles
would not have reached the result that the Court did in Prima Paint.
While issues of federalism do not significantly present themselves in this
case, issues of role and statutory interpretation certainly do.
The Bickelian perspective respects institutional competence, and
indeed, one of the central reasons why Bickel argued in favor of the
passive virtues was because of courts' limited institutional capacity to
decide questions of policy.14 8  The separability doctrine directly
contradicts principles of institutional competence because it puts
arbitrators, rather than courts, in the position of deciding questions of
law-to wit, the legal validity of the contract containing an arbitration
provision. As Justice Black famously exclaimed in dissent in Prima
Paint:
The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of a
contract's voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons
designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid
contract between the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds
144. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); see also
supra Part II.B.1.
145. See Reuben, supra note 41, at 838-40.
146. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
147. See Reuben, supra note 41, at 841-48 (criticizing Prima Paint's holding on separability).
148. See supra Part lI.A.
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are to adjudicate the legal validity of the contract need not even be
lawyers, and in all probability will be nonlawyers, wholly unqualified
to decide legal issues, and even if qualified to apply the law, not bound
to do so. ... I am fully satisfied that a reasonable and fair reading of
[the FAA's] language and history shows that both Congress and the
framers of the Act were at great pains to emphasize that nonlawyers
designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controversies arising out of
valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts' prerogative to
decide the legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon
which to base an arbitration.'49
The opinion fares no better under principles of Scalian conservative
textualism. The central FAA provision in play was section 4, which
provides a remedy for a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement
by permitting the enforcing party to go to a federal district court to
compel the resisting party into arbitration.s15  The statute assigns the
court the duty of determining whether there is a valid agreement to
arbitrate, and if the court determines after a hearing that there is, then the
statute says that the court shall issue an order compelling the parties to
proceed to arbitration according to the terms of the agreement; otherwise,
the parties proceed directly to trial."5' The statute, thus, contemplates the
judiciary as the gatekeeper for agreements to arbitrate. When there is a
dispute about its validity, and a court determines the clause is valid, the
agreement is enforced. 15 2
The difficult interpretive question, of course, is the meaning of the
language "and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue."' 5 3  The
Court's construction of it applying only to the arbitration clause, rather
than the contract as a whole, is certainly plausible, but it is quite a reach
given the overall structure of the FAA and the central role it posits for
courts as gatekeepers for the arbitration system-a context that
149. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). The key language states in relevant part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall
make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
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traditionally informs textual analysis.15 4  But the Court eschews such
analysis in favor of a more creative interpretation that treats arbitration
clauses as separate contracts from the larger substantive contract in
which they are embedded, making arbitration clauses unique from all
other contract clauses in the law as far as I know. This interpretation
further frustrates another foundational principle or maxim of statutory
interpretation-that statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results,
such as a non-lawyer arbitrator deciding questions of law (to wit, the
validity of the document giving rise to their jurisdiction).'ss
In my view, a more restrained, conservative reading of this language
would consider this statutory clause in light of the overall structure of the
FAA and compel a conclusion that the court, not the arbitrator, would
need to decide the question of the larger container contract. If the
container contract is void, then all of the terms of the contract are void as
well, including the arbitration clause.
B. Southland and Preemption
In Southland, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts
contrary state laws-in this case, a California Franchise Investment Law
provision barring the arbitration of claims brought under it.15' This
obviously implicates the federalism principle of judicial conservatism,
but it also raises issues of restraint and textualism. For the sake of
analytical clarity, however, I begin by exploring the federalism issue.
Preemption is strong medicine for judicial conservatives like
Rehnquist because it effectively displaces important state policies with a
federal rule, and as such, the Court has only recognized preemption as
154. The Court in United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forrest Associates, Inc.
discussed textual analysis, stating:
Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of
the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted). For a general discussion of the textualist approach, see
Frank B. Cross, Essay, The Significance ofStatutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1971, 1972-74 (2007).
155. The classic case on the absurdity doctrine is Holy Trinity Church v. United States. 143 U.S.
457, 459-61 (1892). For a concise discussion of the absurdity doctrine, see Andrew S. Gold,Absurd
Results, Scrivener's Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 25, 53-56 (2006). For a
more comprehensive treatment, and a call to curtail the doctrine, see John F. Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).
156. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
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appropriate in three circumstances. The first is direct or express
preemption, where Congress has explicitly stated its intent to preempt
contrary state laws.157 The second is implied or field preemption, where
"Congress [has] left no room for the States to supplement [the federal
statute].""ss Finally, there is conflict preemption, where it would be
simply impossible for the state and federal law to coexist as a practical
matter.'59
The FAA is silent on the preemption issue of preemption,160 meaning
that if preemption is to be justified in a principled way, it must be either
field or conflict preemption. Of the two, conflict preemption seems most
implausible in that the FAA and contrary state laws could plainly exist
side by side as different regimes covering different types of claims in
different jurisdictions. Indeed, this is precisely what Congress intended,
wrote Justice O'Connor in her Southland dissent. "One rarely finds a
legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's. That history
establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a
procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress
believed, largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts."16 ' As conceived by the Act's drafters, she argued, those
seeking to enforce arbitration agreements relating to federal claims in
federal courts would rely on the FAA, while those pursuing arbitrations
at the state level would use the similar state laws that all states have
adopted.162 Even if one disagrees with Justice O'Connor's view of the
clarity of the legislative history, to the extent that conflict preemption is
predicated on necessity because the federal and state regimes simply will
not work together, the FAA in no way meets that standard.
That leaves the possibility of field preemption, where Congress's
regulation of the field is so pervasive that it leaves little room for the
states to act, thus evidencing an intent to occupy the field.163 As noted
above, however, the FAA hardly embodies a comprehensive regulatory
157. Gade v. Nat'1 Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
158. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159. Id.
160. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
161. Southland, 465 U.S at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 31-33; see also Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall
Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1103, 1152 (2009) (noting that all states have passed either the
Uniform Arbitration Act or its successor, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act).
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
9072012]
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 907 2011-2012
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
regime. 164 To the contrary, it simply establishes a rule that permits the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, sets rudimentary default rules for
the operation of arbitration proceedings, and provides for the
enforceability of arbitral awards and the conditions under which such
awards may be set aside or modified. 16 5 Many other issues remain open
for state regulation, such as the availability of punitive damages, rules of
discovery, and the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. It is no
small irony that the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and its predecessor,
the Uniform Arbitration Act, deal precisely with these issues. 166 Because
we know there is room for states to act because they have, in fact, acted,
field theory is also not a compelling justification for preemption.
As we can thus see, no theory of preemption justifies the holding in
Southland. Therefore, it is not surprising that Chief Justice Burger's
opinion avoided the topic entirely and instead made the argument that
preemption was necessary because of Congress' reliance on the
Commerce Power in adopting the FAA.16 7 This is, however, a factual
question that Justice O'Connor sharply disputed, as she claimed that the
constitutional authority for the FAA was not the Commerce Clause but
rather the constitutional power of Congress to control the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. 68  Reasonable minds can, and do, disagree on this
issue.169 But in making a Commerce Clause claim for preemption
instead of adopting a more traditional preemption analysis, we can at
least conclude that Chief Justice Burger was reaching for a rationale, if
not a result.
This is precisely what Bickel would have counseled the Chief Justice
against. Bickel called for restraint and urged courts to use such
technicalities as standing, ripeness, and other procedural barriers to
access to avoid judicial decision-making unless it was necessary for the
court to decide the dispute.170 Thus, his notion of restraint went further
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See Timothy J. Heinsz, The 2000 Revision to the Uniform Arbitration Act: A Harbinger?, 3
PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 435, 435-41 (2003) (providing a summary of the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act by its reporter).
167. Southland, 465 U.S. at 11-13.
168. Id. at 28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002) (providing an excellent account
of the scholarly and judicial criticism of Southland and an attempt to demonstrate that the holding
was at least plausible, if not compellingly reasoned).
170. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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than merely avoiding decisions on social policy best left to the political
branches, but instead called upon courts not to act at all unless they really
have to. Put another way, the less the courts rule on substantive issues,
the less likely they will be to inadvertently decide questions of policy,
and the more authority and capital they will have when they do speak.
Such a restrained view would surely expect a congressional intent to
preempt to be quite explicit rather than judicially imposed and would at
least stay within the boundaries of traditional preemption analysis.
Finally, while the federalism arguments are compelling in and of
themselves, they are also well supported by Scalian textualism. The
FAA is replete with references to the federal courts and federal law and
virtually devoid of any references to state courts and state law. Section
3's stay provision, for example, opens by providing "[i]f any suit or
proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States."' 7 1
Section 4's provisions for compelling arbitration similarly empower "[a]
party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration [to] petition any
United States district court which . . . would have jurisdiction under Title
28."l72 The section also makes references to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.173 Finally, section 10's vacatur provisions authorize "the
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made
[to] make an order vacating the award" under specified circumstances,
but they provide no such authorization for vacatur by state courts. 17 4
Thus, applying the Whole Act Rule of statutory interpretation-a
statutory maxim well within the boundaries of textualist analysis---one
could only conclude that the FAA was intended to apply in federal
courts, not in state courts. Again, my point is not to provide yet another
argument as to why Southland was wrongly decided. Rather, it is to
suggest simply that Southland would have gone the other way if it had
been decided under the conservative juridical principles of restraint,
fidelity to text, and states' rights.
171. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
172. Id. § 4.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 10.
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C. Gilmer and the Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court effectively upheld the validity of
mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form contracts.'7 5  It was the
coda on a remarkable about-face by the Court on the issue of whether
arbitration could be used to deny parties access to the public courts for
statutory claims.
This was the question presented in the first significant case decided
under the FAA, Wilko v. Swan.'76  In Wilko, the Court found that
mandatory arbitration clauses in securities brokerage agreements were
not enforceable under the FAA because "the right to select the judicial
forum is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived" under the
Securities Act of 1934.177 The Wilko doctrine thus assured that, at least
as to statutory claims, arbitration did not bar access to the courts.
The shift began just seven years later with the Steelworkers Trilogy
of 1960, as the Court articulated its policy preference for arbitration as
the primary method of dispute resolution in labor relations and called for
any doubts as to arbitrability to be decided in favor of arbitrability.
The Court took care to steer its holdings away from the commercial
context and keep them focused on the collective bargaining context,
where arbitration effectively substitutes for worker strikes. 17 9 A quarter
of a century later, however, the Court obliterated that distinction in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
holding that the purpose of the FAA was to create a body of federal
substantive law that governs in either state or federal courts and
introducing language into arbitration jurisprudence that provided a
cornerstone for much of the Court's later work:
Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive
or procedural policies to the contrary. .. . [Q]uestions of arbitrability
must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of
175. 500 U.S. 20, 30-33 (1991).
176. 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
177. Id. at 434-35.
178. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
179. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567; Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578; Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at
598-99.
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federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration ... 10
Two years later, in 1985, the Court affirmed the arbitrability of
statutory claims in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Inc., finding that without "compelling considerations, the Act itself
provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims
by skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.""' By the
late 1980s, there was little for the Court to do but formally reverse the
ouster doctrine, which it did in 1989 in Rodriguez de QuUas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.182
Gilmer extended these cases and opened the door to the use of
arbitration agreements for the wide variety of consumer and employment
disputes that we see today. It has also been widely criticized, but the
question for purposes of this Article is simply whether the result would
have been different if it had been decided by a truly conservative Court.
Our inquiry is initially complicated by two issues, ignored by the Gilmer
Court, that were vital to the Court's decision and to Gilmer's enduring
legacy of controversy-consent and standard form contracts.!83
Consent is an issue because the decision to arbitrate under the FAA
is a volitional and consensual act, as the Court has long recognized.184
Standard form contracts are an issue because the law generally assumes
that parties have consented to all terms, even though most people do
not.'8 5  The actual consent to arbitrate assumed by the FAA and the
presumed intent imputed by the law of standard form contracts do not
easily square with one another. This was the heart of the subtextual fight
in Gilmer18 6 Assuming the validity of standard form contracts (as the
Gilmer Court did), is it appropriate for a standardized contract to include
a provision that waives the rights of employees to have courts decide
whether rights granted to them legislatively have been violated, given
that the FAA appears to call for actual consent?
180. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
181. 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
182. 490 U.S. 477, 479-84(1989).
183. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-38, 43 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Court ignored the issues of consent and standard form contracts).
184. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (citing cases
recognizing that the standard of review should turn on whether the parties agreed to arbitrate).
185. See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 179-81 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing
mutuality as it applies to consenting to standard form contracts).
186. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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As previously discussed, a generation before, the Wilko Court had
decided that the answer to this question was "no" and that the right to
take a statutory claim was not the "kind of right" that could be waived
through an arbitration clause. 87  But as was also discussed, the Court
formally repudiated that rule in the Shearson cases, holding that
consumer claims under federal securities laws may be subject to
arbitration.'88 One way to look at Gilmer, then, is as a mere extension to
the employment context of the Shearson rule that consumer statutory
claims could be subject to arbitration. Such an interpretation does little
to offend the principles of conservative jurisprudence.
Gilmer went much farther, however, because it reversed the
presumption, previously unquestioned, that Congress intended for
statutory claims to be brought in courts of law.' 89 Rather than beginning
with public trial as the default for statutory enforcement, the Gilmer
Court placed the burden on the plaintiff "to show that Congress intended
to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for [statutory] claims."' 90 As
Justice White further wrote for the Court:
If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the
[statute], its legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between
arbitration and the [statute's] underlying purposes. Throughout such an
inquiry it should be kept in mind that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration."' 9'
Justice White did not stop there. He set a nearly insurmountable bar
for what constitutes an inherent conflict between the private arbitral
forum and the vindication of the statute's intent by making clear the
Court's view that the change in decisional forum from public courts to
arbitration is just a change of forum that does not affect substantive
rights.19 2 He rejected the argument that the remedial function of public
adjudication of statutory claims can be lost in arbitration,193 and he
187. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quyas, 490 U.S.
477.
188. Rodriguez de Quitas, 490 U.S. at 479-84; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
189. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
190. Id
191. Id (citation omitted) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
192. Id
193. Id at 27-28.
912 [Vol. 60
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 912 2011-2012
FAA LAW, WITHOUT THE ACTIVISM
summarily dismissed generalized concerns, such as arbitral bias and the
accurate application of the law, as old hostility to arbitration.19 4 Such
claims may be established in particular cases, Justice White noted, but
provide no basis for a general challenge to arbitration today.'9 5
So it is against this necessary background that we can finally turn to
the question of Gilmer's fidelity to conservative judicial principles.
From a Bickelian perspective of restraint, the Court clearly overstepped
its bounds in two ways. First, it did far more than simply decide the
question before it, which was the arbitrability of ADEA claims. 96
Rather, casting restraint aside, it reached out and reversed the normal
presumption that Congress intended statutory claims to be brought in
court and instead required plaintiffs to show that Congress intended to
preclude the arbitration of claims and, further yet, set an extraordinarily
high bar for making such claims. 19 Second, and perhaps more troubling
for a Bickelian conservative, the Court decided an important question of
policy that should have been left to the political branches: the legitimacy
of mandatory arbitration.'98  This is clearly a question of policy upon
which reasonable people can and do very deeply disagree, and by that
standard alone, it is one that should be decided by the legislature rather
than the courts.199 The Court has no competence to bring to the question
of mandatory arbitration, only preference, and the legitimacy of any
decision on that issue would only benefit from its vetting through the
many voices and stages of the legislative process. By deciding this
policy question itself rather than deferring it to the political branches, the
Court crossed the line that separates mere conservatism from
conservative activism.200
From a textualist perspective, Gilmer is less problematic. Looking
first at the FAA, the Court's decision is justified in that section 2's
savings clause only calls for the repudiation of an agreement to arbitrate
"upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 2 01 As noted above, the complicating factor here is that the
194. Id. at 30-33.
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id. at 23.
197. Id. at 30-33.
198. Id. at 33-35.
199. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-18 (2000) (discussing the
powers afforded the coordinate branches of government).
200. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
201. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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agreement to arbitrate is presumed because the clause appears in a
standard form contract.202 While controversial during their earlier years,
standard form contracts today have become commonplace. Standard
form contracts are generally valid today if they are conscionable, and if
we set aside as otherwise resolved the Wilko question of whether a party
may properly waive court access rights in a standard form contract, then
the Gilmer holding does not offend principles of textualism. The FAA
does not specifically, or by its terms impliedly, preclude the inclusion of
arbitration provisions in standard form contracts for employment.20 3 The
ADEA does not expressly preclude the arbitration of age discrimination
claims, and so a ruling that Gilmer's ADEA claim can be compelled into
arbitration surely would not offend textualist principles.
From a federalism perspective, however, Gilmer is far more
troubling, especially when considered in concert with Southland's rule of
preemption. Read together, they essentially mean that states can do little
to protect their citizens when franchisors, service providers, employers,
and other institutional players choose to put arbitration provisions in their
standard form contracts. This is not mere conjecture. After Gilmer,
Montana, for example, passed a law requiring consumer, employer, and
other standard form contracts with arbitration provisions to simply put
those provisions in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract.204 The Supreme Court, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, held that the FAA preempted this statute because it was
hostile to arbitration in that it invalidated the arbitration provisions of
non-complying contracts. 20 5 From a federalism perspective, it is telling
that two justices of the Montana Supreme Court refused to sign the
remand order returning the case from the U.S. Supreme Court to the
lower Montana courts, calling the Supreme Court's decision
"philosophically misguided" in their symbolic protest of federal intrusion
into states' rights.20 6
202. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 176-82, 188-98 and accompanying text.
204. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1989), preempted by 9 U.S.C. § 2, as recognized in
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
205. 517 U.S. at 687-88.
206. Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme
Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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D. Circuit City and the Employee Exemption
In Circuit City, a sharply divided Court held that the employee
exemption in section 1 was limited to employees in the transportation
207industry. Federalism and restraint have less bearing on the analysis
than textualism, so it is there that I will focus my discussion.
Despite its logical appeal, textualism has been criticized for its rigid
formalism and impracticability given the variety of meanings that can be
attached to words, as well as the natural instinct to interpret words in the
larger written and environmental contexts in which they are expressed.208
Indeed, this criticism suggests that textualism provides no greater
protection against the imposition of the personal policy preferences of
the decision maker than traditional statutory analysis, which looks first to
the text and then to the intent, purpose, and history of the statute to
derive proper statutory interpretation.20 9 In this regard, Circuit City
provides a good example of problems with strong textualism.
Again, section 1 of the FAA provides the critical language,
exempting from coverage of the Act "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
,,210foreign or interstate commerce. So, on the face of the statute, the
language "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" 211 would appear to unambiguously exclude workers from the
reach of the statute. This was the point of the Circuit City dissenters,
who accused the majority of "playing ostrich" by refusing to consider the
legislative history of the exemption. 2 12  "History amply supports the
proposition that it was an uncontroversial provision that merely
confirmed the fact that no one interested in the enactment of the FAA
ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment
contracts."213
But in his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy extended his textual
analysis beyond the language of the statute to draw upon a judicial
207. 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
208. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 340-45 (1990) (criticizing textualism as a foundational approach
to statutory interpretation).
209. See Eskridge, supra note 123, at 626-40 (discussing traditional considerations in statutory
interpretation).
210. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
211. Id.
212. 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
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maxim of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, under which a
general, residual clause-here the workers exemption-should be
controlled by the preceding terms.2 14 That had a narrowing effect here,
Kennedy observed, because it compelled the Court to read the "any class
of workers" residual clause as being limited to the kinds of workers
identified in the preceding terms, "seamen" and "railroad employees."215
As a result, otherwise qualifying disputes involving all other non-
transportation workers would still fall within the FAA.
But if "new textualism" 216 is to be taken seriously, there was no need
to resort to canons of interpretation because the text was unambiguous as
previously described. Moreover, while canons of statutory interpretation
seem to carry unusual gravitas by their test of time, they are hardly
consistent and easily manipulable.2 17 As Professor Llewellyn pointed out
more than a half century ago, for any canon of statutory interpretation,
one can find another canon that compels a court to reach the opposite
conclusion.2 18 In the case of the ejusdem generis canon, for example,
one could just as easily have reached the opposite result using the
judicial maxim holding "ejusdem generis is only an aid in getting the
meaning and does not warrant confining the operations of a statute
within narrower limits than were intended,"219 or even more pointedly,
"[i]f language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect." 22 0
221
Though perhaps compelled by preference to outcome, the Court
clearly was not required to resort to the ejusdem generis maxim in the
interpretation of this statutory language-although the outcome might
have been different if the Court had merely adhered to the unambiguous
language of the statute. The majority made a choice, and that choice
represented the personal preferences of the five "conservative"
214. Id. at I14-15 (majority opinion).
215. Id. at ll8-19.
216. See Eskridge, supra note 123, at 623-24 (briefly describing the new textualism approach to
statutory interpretation).
217. See id. at 675 (noting canons are "notoriously numerous and manipulable").
218. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing
contradictory canons of statutory interpretation).
219. Id. at 405.
220. Id. at 403.
221. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001) (noting that the FAA's
statutory context and purpose compelled the Court to construe section 1 narrowly).
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Justices-Kennedy (its author), Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas.2 22
E. Concepcion and Class Arbitration
As a formal matter, the most recent of the bellwether cases,
Concepcion, simply held that state rules regarding the unconscionability
of class action waivers are preempted by the FAA.223 Two aspects of the
case, however, are salient for our purposes-the Court's discussion of
class actions and its holding on section 2's savings clause.
On the class action side, Concepcion is the latest in a line of
decisions that almost surely will come to hold that class actions generally
may not be brought in arbitration under the FAA. "Arbitration is poorly
suited to the higher stakes of class litigation," Justice Scalia wrote for the
5-4 majority, noting the lack of substantive review of arbitration
awards.224 Justice Scalia also noted that "[w]e find it hard to believe that
defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review,
and even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow
state courts to force such a decision." 2 2 5 This language echoes passages
in Justice Alito's 2011 opinion in Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp., in which Justice Alito wrote that "[w]e think that the
differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for
arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the
FAA, that the parties' mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration
constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings." 22 6
Such language in the Court's two most recent arbitration opinions
appears to spell doom for the future availability of class procedures in
arbitration under the FAA. To be sure, carving out class actions may or
may not be a good idea for the reasons that the Court describes.2 27 But
from a Bickelian perspective, this is not the Court's decision to make.
Indeed, even if viewed from the contract-based perspective that has
228
characterized much of the Court's arbitration jurisprudence, the
222. Id. at 107.
223. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
224. Id. at 1752.
225. Id.
226. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
227. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
228. See generally Ware, supra note 59 (discussing the contract-based perspective of arbitration
jurisprudence).
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decision of whether to use class actions in arbitration is a strategic choice
of the parties in the first instance. If they want to have an arbitrator
decide a class action, who is the Court to say they cannot? The FAA
clearly does not preclude the use of class procedures, and in fact, one of
the nation's leading providers of arbitration services, the American
Arbitration Association, has long had specific procedures for class
arbitrations.229 If we are to preclude the possibility of party choice of
class arbitration, then that decision should come from the parties or
elected legislature, not from the appointed courts.
Moreover, if that choice is to be subject to regulation, then principles
of institutional competence compel that decision to be made by the
political branches, not appointed courts. This question is a value-laden
one of policy that should be decided on the basis of debate within the
political sphere, where affected constituents can work to educate
legislators and the public, and marshal their resources to achieve their
preferred legislative outcome. Judges trained to apply rules have no
competence with which to make this policy choice other than personal or
institutional preference-bases that a true conservative judicial
philosophy abhors.
As troubling as this aspect of the opinion is from the perspective of
true judicial conservatism, more troubling is the majority's ruling on the
savings clause issue. As discussed above, section 2 permits the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate unless the agreement may be
voided "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract., 23 0 Since contract law is primarily a creature of state
law, this language has preserved an important role for the states,
including the state courts, in assuring that parties compelled into
arbitration actually agreed to do so in the first place. In this era of
standardized form arbitration agreements, it has provided a means of
policing adhesive arbitration provisions, primarily through the
application of state unconscionability doctrines.23 1
That is precisely what happened in Concepcion. The California
Supreme Court, interpreting its state's general law of unconscionability
in Discover Bank, identified certain conditions under which class action
229. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org (follow "Search Rules" hyperlink; then search "Class Arbitration";
then follow "Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration" hyperlink).
230. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
231. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746-48 (discussing the application of California's
unconscionability doctrine).
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waivers will render an arbitration clause unconscionable-when the
damages are small and the party with superior bargaining power has
engaged in a deliberate scheme of stealing small sums of money from
large numbers of people.23 2
The Discover Bank rule was simply the application of a general rule
of state contract law to the specific context of arbitration. Ordinarily, a
state supreme court's interpretation of its own state statutes is entitled to
enormous deference by the Court.2 33 The Scalia majority, however-in
the Court's first construction of the savings clause-found that "nothing
in [the clause] suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."23 4
Applying this principle to hold the California Supreme Court's Discover
Bank rule preempted by the FAA demonstrates its remarkable
encroachment on state contract police powers. Under Concepcion, a
state supreme court's interpretation of a state contract law of general
applicability will be preempted if it results in the invalidation of an
arbitration clause.235
The problem with this analysis, of course, is that the very purpose of
the savings clause is to invalidate arbitration clauses when they are
unenforceable as a matter of general state contract law.236 If taken
seriously then, Concepcion renders the savings clause essentially
meaningless, effectively ending state police authority over contracts with
arbitration provisions. It is difficult to imagine an outcome more at odds
with conservative notions of federalism. As Justice Breyer wrote in a
dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan:
"[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action." But federalism is as much a question of
deeds as words. It often takes the form of a concrete decision by this
Court that respects the legitimacy of a State's action in an individual
case. Here, recognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific
232. Id. at 1746 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740).
233. See Jason Mazzone, The Bill ofRights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1, 56-58
(2007) (discussing deference to state court rulings on state law). The Court, however, has also been
willing to ignore this rule when it wants. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000) (per
curiam) (refusing to defer to the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida election law).
234. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Given Justice Scalia's textualist aversion for legislative
intent and legislative purpose, his choice of the word "objectives" is especially noteworthy.
235. Id.
236. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold California's
law, not to strike it down.237
V. CONCLUSION: FAA LAW WITHOUT THE ACTIVISM
In an important article critical of the Court's ramp-up on mandatory
arbitration, Professors Carrington and Haagen called the Court's
arbitration jurisprudence a "shantytown" that puts the needy at the mercy
of the most powerful in a second-class system of justice.238 As much as I
agree with their sentiment, the image raised by the Court's work is very
different for me.
As I look at the Court's arbitration jurisprudence, reflected in the
five bellwether cases analyzed above, I am reminded not of ghettos and
slums, but of opulence and arrogance at the wielding of raw, unchecked
power. The image that comes to my mind is that of the legendary Orson
Welles movie Citizen Kane, in which media magnate Charles Foster
Kane built Xanadu, a colossal mansion made of the finest materials and
decorated with art collected from around the world, which stood as a
monument to Kane's wealth and power and to an inspiration for
happiness that he could never find.239
Like Kane's Xanadu, the Court's arbitration jurisprudence is a
monument to unchecked power as it has relentlessly pursued its own
version of civil justice reform-a junior varsity private system of
adjudication that allows powerful parties to use standard form contracts
to strip unsuspecting consumers, employees, and others of their right to a
day in court, or even application of the law. 24 0 A system that assumes
fairness of process but sets the highest of bars for complaints.24 1 And
finally, a system that applies to all cases-state and federal,242 judicial
237. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
238. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 25, at 401 ("As architecture, the arbitration law made by
the Court is a shantytown. It fails to shelter those who most need shelter. And those it is intended to
shelter are ill-housed. Under the law written by the Court, birds of prey will sup on workers,
consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees; the protective police power of the federal
government and especially of the state governments is weakened; and at least some and perhaps
many commercial arbitrations will be made more costly while courts determine whether arbitrators
have been faithful to certain federal laws.").
239. CITIZEN KANE (RKO Pictures 1941).
240. See supra Part IV.C.
241. See supra Part IV.C.
242. See supra Part IV.B.
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and administrative 243 --eXcept those, like class actions, that the Court, of
its own accord, decides are inappropriate for arbitration.244 Like Kane,
the Court has spared no expense and cut no corners in its construction,
using its lavish "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration"245 to give
arbitrators the power to decide the most serious of legal issues even if
they are not attorneys, 246 to deny states the ability to pass laws in any
way regulating arbitration agreements if that regulation would lead to the
invalidation of an agreement to arbitrate,247 and now, most recently, to
refuse to permit the application of even general contract law to an
arbitration provision if it would interfere with the "purposes and
248
objectives" of the FAA, however the Court chooses to define them.
If judicial conservatism may be defined in terms of restraint and
fidelity to text, and activism may be defined in terms of a court imposing
its own agenda into the words of a rule,2 49 the forgoing analysis makes it
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Court's arbitration
jurisprudence has not fulfilled the promise of conservative presidents for
a more conservative jurisprudence. To the contrary, it can only be
characterized as results-oriented activism every bit as offensive to a
principled jurisprudence as the excesses of the Warren Court a half
250century ago.
Much of the Court's arbitration jurisprudence has been in the name
of being pro-arbitration by supporting the theoretical agreement of the
parties to arbitrate. Yet reasonable minds may disagree as to whether the
243. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) ("When parties agree to arbitrate all questions
arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another
forum, whether judicial or administrative.").
244. See supra Part IV.E.
245. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
246. See supra Part IV.A.
247. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
248. See supra Part IV.E.
249. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study ofJudicial Activism, 91
MINN. L. REv. 1752, 1754 (2007) (defining judicial activism as "actions that are more clearly
grounded in a Justice's ideology than in legitimate legal sources"); see also id. at 1755-70
(providing a thorough discussion of some of the different understandings of "judicial activism").
250. As Justice O'Connor stated bluntly:
[Olver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation. I have no doubt that Congress could enact, in the
first instance, a federal arbitration statute that displaces most state arbitration laws. But I
also have no doubt that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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Court's arbitration jurisprudence is good for arbitration, and I for one am
unconvinced, as legitimacy continues to elude arbitration just as
happiness did Charles Foster Kane. Rare today is the popular article or
news story extolling the virtues of arbitration. Far more common are
stories about surprise and abuse in the arbitration process. 251 Powerful
and respected organizations, such as the Consumers Union, have taken
positions against mandatory arbitration.2 52 While it is true that these are
positions against mandatory arbitration and not all arbitration, the general
public is not always so nuanced in its understanding.
As even the staunchest of arbitration advocates have recognized,
arbitration as a dispute resolution process operates under a cloud that is
by and large a product of the Court's activism. 2 53 Like other institutions,
dispute resolution processes depend heavily on public perceptions of
254their legitimacy. If the process is not perceived as legitimate, then
parties will not use it-unless, as in the case of mandatory arbitration,
they have no choice. Such compulsion exacts costs on the legitimacy of
the larger rule of law system in which arbitration is embedded. 25 5
So we end where we began, with the question of what arbitration
would look like under the FAA without the activism and if the bellwether
cases had been decided by a truly conservative Court. This is necessarily
a speculative exercise, but here is my best guess.
For one, it would have a less prominent place in the universe of
dispute resolution for a number of reasons. Most obviously, parties with
superior bargaining power would not be able to impose it upon
251. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcey, & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration
Empire Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A14; Bob Carlson, First
Business, Now Health Care: Signing Away One's Right To Sue, MANAGED CARE (June 2002),
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0206/0206.binding.html; All Things Considered: Rape
Case Highlights Arbitration Debate (NPR radio broadcast June 9, 2009), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=105153315.
252. In 2005, the Consumers Union led more than two dozen consumer groups in urging the
abolition of mandatory arbitration. Press Release, Consumers Union, Groups Launch Nationwide
Effort to Stop Use of Binding Mandatory Arbitration Clauses (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-financialservices/002025.html.
253. Richard Chernick, Imposed-Arbitration Reforms Threaten to Stifle Strengths ofCommercial
Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 16, 19.
254. The legitimacy of dispute resolution processes has been studied as a part of procedural
justice. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to
Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-58 (2001); see also Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: The Problem ofArbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 311-18 (2004)
(discussing implications of legitimacy and compliance research on democracy and the rule of law).
255. See Reuben, supra note 254, at 309-18 (discussing the democratic consequences of
mandatory arbitration).
922 [Vol. 60
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 922 2011-2012
FAA LAW, WITHOUT THE ACTIVISM
consumers, employees, franchisees, and other less powerful parties in
standard form contracts of adhesion. Rather, the law would require an
actual written agreement to arbitrate between the parties,256 which could
certainly be pre-dispute as between parties of equal bargaining power.
FAA arbitration would also be less prominent because the FAA
would only apply in federal courts, not state courts, and would not
operate to preempt state laws that would invalidate agreements to
arbitrate as unlawful contracts by reason of state policy. Rather than
being overwhelmed by a distended federal policy favoring arbitration,
state law applied by state court judges would be the primary determinant
of the validity of an agreement to arbitrate, as with any other contractual
term.257 Where general state contract law principles or specific rules of
state public policy would invalidate the arbitration provision, it would
simply be void. Crucially in this regard, the courts, not arbitrators,
would play the crucial gatekeeping role of determining the validity of the
arbitration agreement under applicable principles of state law.258
While arbitration might be a less visible feature of the dispute
resolution landscape, it would, in my view, be a less controversial, more
legitimate, and perhaps more popular instrument of dispute resolution
than it is today. Because arbitration would be subject to the actual
consent of the parties, actively policed by courts according to legal
standards, and subject to other public policies, motions to compel
arbitration would be relatively rare because the parties would actually
want to be in arbitration. Put another way, parties would be in arbitration
for the right reasons-that it makes the most sense in their opinion as a
way to resolve a particular dispute-rather than being forced into
arbitration against their will. There are many good reasons to choose
arbitration-flexibility in decisional standards, speed, finality, and
privacy to name just a few-and focusing clearly on these issues would
underscore the practical utility of the process for those tasked with
deciding upon a method of legal dispute resolution.259
Many of the most significant theoretical controversies in arbitration
would also diminish. Mandatory arbitration would be off the table in
favor of actual consent. The arbitrability of statutory claims would
256. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (evidencing the "written provision" language).
257. See id.
258. See § 4 (evidencing such a role for the courts).
259. See Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel,
Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 278-84 (2007) (discussing the core process characteristics and
values of commercial arbitration under the FAA).
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simply be a matter of consent, as would the availability of class actions
in arbitration. The morass of manifest disregard would perhaps fade
away because the distinction between public adjudication as a law-bound
process and the arbitration process as a process not necessarily bound by
law would be cleared rather than blurred. Creeping legalism and
concerns about arbitration morphing into just another version of
litigation 26 0 would abate as willing parties would be better able to work
with the arbitration process instead of against it. All of this would
support the efficacy of arbitration as a viable and attractive dispute
resolution option, and one far more legitimate than the bizarre and tilted
world of FAA arbitration that the Court has molded through its creativity
and activism. Arbitration would be, in other words, just as it should have
been all along, and that would be good for arbitration.
260. See, e.g., Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Feb.-Apr. 2003, at 37, 38 (noting that arbitration has become a legalistic method of adjudication);
Perry A. Zirkel & Andriy Krahmal, Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or Fiction?,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 243, 258-59 (2 001) (same).
[Vol. 60924
HeinOnline  -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 924 2011-2012
